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Art as Affordance 
 
Katherine Leduc 
 
The question “what is art?” makes a 
characteristic mistake; it assumes that art is 
a noun. True, the word art undoubtedly 
brings to mind such iconic and tangible 
pieces as Michelangelo’s David, Vincent 
Van Gogh’s Starry Night and DaVinci’s 
Mona Lisa. Michelangelo’s David is art in 
the same way that Pride and Prejudice is a 
book. But defining art as a noun is 
problematic. Nouns classify objects and as 
such, they outline a particular set of 
properties and characteristics unique to their 
classification.  Art, however, is a much more 
fluid concept.  
Beyond the aforementioned 
archetypal examples, what is and is not 
considered “art” becomes a source of 
contention. For instance, should artifacts be 
considered artworks? Is a flower a work of 
art? Who decides? I would like to propose 
that “art” is a property. More specifically, 
art is an affordance, inherent to the 
materiality of any object that is articulated 
through a communicative and technical 
process.  
This paper will address and 
challenge the “noun-ness” of art. It will 
examine the way in which objects, observers 
and artists relate to one another through their 
materiality, how this communication may be 
interpreted as a type of action, and how such 
an action illuminates the affordance of “art-
ness”. Concluding this discussion, I will 
address some potential problems with the art 
as affordance definition by contrasting it 
with some of the more dominant art theories. 
 
Materiality and Affordances 
What we must first acknowledge 
about an object’s potentiality for “art-ness” 
is its real life materiality, its physical entity. 
The world, unarguably, consists of material 
objects. Whether human, animal, or plant we 
are all grounded in material form; flesh, 
organs, leaves, veins, water, carbon, oxygen, 
and so on. Anything therefore, be it a 
painting, a sculpture, or a word written in 
sand, possesses some form of materiality 
such that it exists within this world. In 
addition to such materiality, we also consist 
of certain qualities and properties, which 
complement that form. Naturally, we may 
have the potential for some qualities and not 
others, such that I may be capable of 
running swiftly, whereas you may not. Thus, 
we come to the concept of affordance. 
The term “affordance” was created 
and defined by James J. Gibson (1979:127), 
as “the complementarity of the animal and 
the environment”. Ian Hutchby provides a 
concise example of Gibson’s theory,  
 
[H]umans, along with animals, insects, 
birds and fishes, orient to objects in 
their world (rocks, trees, rivers, etc.) in 
terms of what he called their 
affordances: the possibilities that they 
offer for action. For example, a rock 
may have the affordance, for a reptile, 
of being shelter from the heat of the 
sun; or, for an insect, of concealment 
from a hunter. A river may have the 
affordance, for a buffalo, of providing a 
place to drink; or, for a hippopotamus, 
of being a place to wallow. 
Affordances may thus differ from 
species to species and from context to 
context (Hutchby 2001:26). 
 
Affordances are not subject to change 
relative to the needs of the observer. 
Although the rock may be both shelter from 
the sun and concealment from a hunter, it 
does not lose its ability to be one despite the 
predominance of the other. What the rock 
can and cannot be used for, and which 
properties it does and does not express, 
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serve to define it as distinct from any other 
object. Thus, to put it philosophically, an 
object is always, simultaneously, everything 
that it is and everything that it is not. As 
Hutchby (2001:27) clarifies, “the uses and 
‘values’ of things are not attached to them 
by interpretative procedures or internal 
representations, but are a material aspect of 
the thing as it is encountered in the course of 
action”. Although such affordances are not 
immediately apparent to an observer, they 
are there. Such an idea, I will suggest, has 
implications for defining art objects as well.  
 
Art as Motion 
Many theorists, such as Gell (1998) 
and Kramer (2006), have addressed the 
inherent fluidity of art; art is “motion” or 
“action”, and not merely just a static thing. 
Take for instance, Kramer (2006:6), in her 
book, “Switchbacks: art, ownership and 
Nuxalk national identity” she says she has 
“come to think of ‘art’ as a verb”. In similar 
fashion, Gell (1998:6) considers “art as a  
system of action, intended to change the 
world rather than encode symbolic 
propositions about it”. In this respect, using 
the term “art as argument”, Kramer (2006:6) 
suggests, 
 
Art as argument is both a process and 
an invitation to engage in dialogue. As 
such, it taunts and intrigues; harangues 
and incites reaction; incurs apology 
and, perhaps most important, brings 
recognition. Yet art also feints what it 
represents. It is both tangible and 
intangible, alienable and 
inalienable…The power of art lies in 
this shifting quality, which allows it to 
be many things to many different 
people. 
 
Kramer restricts the idea of art as argument 
specifically to the Nuxalk people, and does 
not explore the universal implications of 
such an idea. Similarly Gell (1998) 
advocates that “[the] evocation of complex 
intentionalities is in fact what serves to 
define artworks” (Gell 2006:229). Gell is 
encouraging “the provision of a critical 
context that would enfranchise ‘artefacts’ 
and allow for their circulation as artworks” 
(Gell 2006:234), but his statement extends 
beyond the problem of “art or artefact” and 
brings us to a place where we may examine 
art, not only as an object, but also as an 
action.  
 
The Art Affordance  
How do we conceive of an object as 
an action? According to Gibson, an 
affordance “is equally a fact of the 
environment and a fact of behaviour. It is 
both physical and psychical, yet neither. An 
affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to the observer” 
(1979:129). Affordances are therefore, 
“properties of things taken with reference to 
an observer but not properties of the 
experiences of the observer” (Gibson 
1979:137). Consider an example; anything 
could possess the quality or property of 
swiftness, but only insofar as it is given 
motion by some internal or external agent. A 
fox, moving swiftly through a field is given 
such motion through the force of its own 
will; while an object such as a book may be 
considered stationary until I hurl it across 
the room, whereby it “swiftly” moves 
through the air. Once the fox stops and the 
book lands however, the quality of swiftness 
is no longer apparent. Indeed, it was only by 
the fox’s own movement and by my 
throwing the book that this property was 
exposed. The action of running and moving 
swiftly is coupled with, and almost 
indistinguishable from, the property of 
swiftness. The agent and the property must 
occur together or else the affordance will 
remain imperceptible. In revealing the action 
of art, so too, must there be some sort of 
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internal or external agent to make this 
affordance apparent. What then, gives art its 
motion? 
 
Motion Through Action 
 According to Gell the appreciation 
for, and ascription of art status to an object 
comes about through a process which he 
termed the technology of enchantment 
(1992). Basically, art objects are beautiful 
(and therefore may be considered art) 
because they are the only objects which are 
“beautifully made, or made beautiful” (Gell 
1992:44). Because they are made to be 
beautiful based on a “technically achieved 
level of excellence” (Gell 1992:43), they 
may be considered products of techniques. 
Here, Gell has attributed the title of art to an 
object by defining the process that resulted 
in the object’s creation. In this sense, we can 
begin to see how an object may acquire the 
properties of motion based on an idea 
originating in some kind of action; in this 
case, the execution of a particular technique. 
But it is not only the technique which gives 
an object its “art-ness”, for there is another, 
much more significant, component involved 
and that is the role of the observer. 
 
The Observer 
 Only an observer may appreciate the 
technical process that created the object. In 
much the same way that the fox may be said 
to have acquired the property of “swiftness” 
through its own internal will, so too, may the 
attribution of art to an object be created 
through the observer’s internal recognition 
of an object’s external technical process.  
 This internal process is limited to 
beautifully made or made beautiful objects, 
thereby omitting any and all objects of 
natural beauty. Nevertheless, Gell lays the 
foundation for our theory of art that is rooted 
in the discovery of an object’s affordance 
through a particular action, that of 
communication.  
 
 
The Action of Communication 
Communication is understood to be a 
kind of exchange of information. If we 
accept this definition, it would be fair to say 
that communication establishes a 
relationship between at least two things.  
In the case of person-to-person 
interaction, communication is accomplished 
through reciprocation, whereby I ask you a 
question and you answer, etc. This scenario 
does not have to be successful in order to be 
acknowledged as a form of communication. 
For instance, suppose interacting with an 
individual who does not speak the same 
language, or they do not speak at all - 
perhaps they are using a variety of hand 
signals and sign language. As the recipient 
of this exchange, you do not understand the 
communication in any way you are able to 
reciprocate. You can, however, 
acknowledge that despite your inability to 
comprehend the other person’s meaning 
they are nonetheless engaging in some form 
of communication. In this sense, we can see 
how communication does not necessarily 
have to be reciprocated in order to be 
understood as communication. But what 
about communication between an object and 
a person?  
Let us look at the role of the artist. 
Gell (1998:23) stresses, “manufactured 
objects are indexes of their makers”. No 
matter what type of manufactured material 
object we are looking at we understand, 
even subconsciously, that the object did not 
just spontaneously come into existence. An 
individual or a group of individuals created 
it, intentionally or unintentionally. In this 
sense, the object may be said to represent or 
“stand in for” the creators themselves. 
Because such an action necessitates a 
concrete and existing object, it therefore has 
the capacity to come into contact with a 
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public. Such a propensity for interaction 
means then that any object has the ability to 
be considered in a communicative way, 
whereby an individual may utilize, 
contemplate or ignore its origins, functions 
etc. 
               Speaking specifically about 
conversation and technology, Hutchby 
addresses an important idea regarding 
communication. He says,  
 
artefacts such as the telephone and the 
internet… [are those which] function 
primarily as technologies through 
which communication of certain sorts 
is enabled. In different ways, both of 
them function as channels by means of 
which individuals or groups can be 
situated in co-presence, yet an abstract 
form of co-presence, in which space 
and often also time separate the 
participants (Hutchby 2001:1).  
 
Art objects function in much the same way 
as those of technology. They situate 
individuals or groups in a virtual co-
presence with the artist, whereby the object 
itself acts as a mediator or substitute for the 
artist. An excellent example of such a 
mediated co-presence occurs with a 
fascinating piece of work called Ghost 
Clock by Wendell Castle. 
 
Mediated Co-Presence: An Object Standing 
in for an Artist 
The Ghost Clock presents to the 
observer a grandfather clock shrouded in 
white linen. However, appearances are 
deceiving, for the object is not a grandfather 
clock, but a masterfully carved piece of 
Hondurans mahogany wood. Initially, the 
observer could have one of three reactions to 
the piece. They could have appreciated, not 
appreciated, or been indifferent to the clock 
as a piece of “art”. Having been told that the 
object is in fact, not what it appears to be, 
the observer is forced into a silent dialogue 
with the artist, a kind of conversation of 
which they may or may not be aware.  
The very creation of the piece, which 
mimics the real life materiality of a 
grandfather clock, was executed by the artist 
in such a manner that was undoubtedly 
meant to fool the observer. Even supposing 
that fooling the observer was not the intent 
of the artist, it may be said that the effective 
mimicry would result in the same outcome, 
regardless of the intent. After being duped 
into such a belief, the observer, now very 
much aware of the actual materiality of the 
piece, can regard the object in a new 
manner. Perhaps now, the observer ponders 
over the clever title of the piece, addressing 
the ways in which the piece is and is not a 
ghost clock, and how their changing 
perceptions of the piece have perhaps altered 
or attributed new meaning to the title. 
Perhaps too, they discuss with their friends 
whether or not such an object should be 
considered art, or perhaps, after this 
revelation, they simply leave. Whatever the 
scenario may be, having been told of its 
deceit, the observer cannot walk away from 
the piece without having participated in 
some form of communication, even if 
unconsciously. The role of the artist is 
therefore one which forces the observer to 
engage in a reflexive thought process which 
is capable of exposing an object’s “art” 
affordance.  
If we argue that man-made objects 
afford in their materiality the opportunity to 
be interpreted as indexes for an artist and 
their intentions, how may we ascribe similar 
ideas of communication to objects which 
have no artist? One may appreciate a 
painting by Monet, a pristine landscape, a 
rock, or a twisted tree and be affected in the 
same manner. In this instance we cannot 
argue that an artist whose intention was to 
have an observer challenge the object’s 
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materiality created such material objects. Or 
perhaps we can, as many religious and 
spiritualist notions may contend, but that is 
not an idea to be addressed within the scope 
of this paper. If a tree or a rock does not act 
as a substitute for another individual, how 
can communication be possible? 
 “The work of art is a physical entity 
which mediates between two beings, and 
therefore creates a social relation between 
them, which in turn provides a channel for 
further social relations and influences” (Gell 
1992:51). For Gell, this definition of art is 
derived strictly from the recognition of 
technical processes of made objects. I argue, 
however, that instead of limiting such 
internal exchanges between object and 
observer to the technical processes of made 
objects, I extend this theory to encompass 
naturally occurring objects as well. In doing 
so, I do not negate the significance which 
comes from acknowledging technical 
processes, because such technical processes 
do admittedly hold many an observer in 
awe, especially when examining objects of 
great intricacy or grandeur. Instead, I seek to 
acknowledge that the very communicative 
process, which transpires between any 
person and any object, has the capacity to 
expose an object’s art affordance. In his 
book, Art as A Social System, Niklas 
Luhmann (2000) addresses concepts such as 
perception and communication in ways that 
allow us to relate the process of 
communication to art objects.  
Luhmann likens communication with 
internal processes such as consciousness. 
That is to say, we are able to understand and 
comprehend the external world based on our 
possession of an internal consciousness. He 
says, “communication accomplishes 
[consciousness] by continually reproducing 
the distinction between utterance (self-
reference) and information (hetero-
reference) under conditions that generate the 
possibility of understanding” (Luhmann 
2000:11). Essentially, communication acts 
to establish the difference between the self 
and external information, such that this 
process is continually reproduced in all of 
our perceptions of the world.  
Unlike perception however, which 
“scan[s] a familiar world for information 
without requiring a special decision on our 
part to do so” (Luhmann 2000:14), 
communication precipitates a more reflexive 
thought process, forcing us to engage with 
an object in a manner that extends beyond 
mere recognition. Indeed, Luhmann 
acknowledges this fact when he says, “art 
aims to retard perception and render it 
reflexive” (2000:14). I contend with his use 
of art as a noun. When looking at an object 
in which one engages in a communicative 
thought process, one may expose the 
affordance of “art-ness”. Consider again the 
example of the book being flung through the 
air.  
 In both instances there is an external 
agent (a person) and an external object. The 
difference, however, lies in the expression of 
motion. Whereas the book acquires its 
quality of swiftness by an externally 
observable action such as throwing, an 
object acquires its quality of “art-ness” by 
an internalized communicative process. But 
perhaps this definition is somewhat broad 
and vague. After all, we may engage in an 
internal dialogue with an object regarding its 
structure and design without ever ascribing 
to it the notion of “art-ness”.  
 
Potential Problems with the Art as 
Affordance Definition 
 To say that “art” is an affordance of 
any object is either a simple idea or an 
erroneous one. Simple, because in the right 
context, it seems that any object could 
indeed be considered an art object. Take for 
instance, Marcel Duchamp’s artwork the 
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“Fountain”, which displayed an ordinary 
urinal, or Andy Warhol’s infamous Brillo 
Box. Such everyday objects, never before 
considered art, suddenly became iconic 
representations of “art”. To consider any 
object a piece of art may seem to be a 
disenchanting notion, since it practically 
equates objects rendered out of skilled 
technical processes with a lump of mud on 
the ground. But I believe such 
disenchantment is necessary to wrench us 
out of the following inadequate art 
definitions and theories. 
 The Institutional art theory controls 
an object’s art affordance by advocating that 
only members within specific art 
communities have the right to decide when 
and if the object should be exposed (Carroll 
2000). Historical accounts of art that “define 
art in terms of some historical relation” 
(Dickie 2000:106) only permit the exposure 
of an object’s art affordance if it is 
legitimized in concepts rooted in the past. 
Aesthetic approaches to art try to categorize 
objects as art based on notions and 
properties of beauty, something very 
subjective and value laden. If we are seeking 
to define art in the same way in which we 
define a chair, then subjective and elitist 
values must be laid aside. One may 
necessarily regard a particular kind of chair 
as hideous while still accepting that it is 
indeed a chair. Such value judgments, 
indeed, aesthetics themselves, have no effect 
on the material properties of the object.  
 It may also be said that art as an 
affordance is an erroneous theory, because, 
as mentioned previously, an affordance 
cannot be based on “interpretative 
procedures or internal representations” 
something which, it may be argued, is the 
inherent problem of defining art today 
(Hutchby 2001:27). In response to this 
argument, I propose that two individuals, 
looking at the same object, may separately 
consider an object to be both art and not art, 
and both be correct, based on their 
individual context, rooted in terms of 
communication. As Eaton Muelder 
(2000:145) addresses “not all intrinsic 
properties of any particular object or event 
are considered worthy of attention” and 
thus,  
 
one looks, listens, touches, tastes, 
smells something’s properties and 
considers the nature of these properties 
and ways in which they are arranged 
and otherwise related. Just which set of 
properties one cares about is 
determined by one’s culture or 
subculture. Wine connoisseurs pay 
close attention to intrinsic features of 
what they drink – features that may be 
completely overlooked by non-
connoisseurs. This is not because of the 
metaphysical nature of wine, it is 
because of the cognitive set of the 
taster (Eaton Muelder 2000:145). 
 
Art as an affordance may be considered in 
much the same fashion. An individual’s 
apparent “subjective” response to an object 
does not negate the affordance, but simply 
addresses whether or not it was 
acknowledged at the time of observation. 
Similarly, the recognition of an object’s 
affordance does not concretely determine 
the materiality of an object, even if it is 
agreed upon by many people - for example, 
language. A word may be used to describe 
any object, for example, a tree. A tree is a 
tree because we call it a tree. It may, 
however, also be called un arbre, baum or 
albero. Each word refers to the same object, 
yet each is individually distinct. The fact 
that the same object may have multiple and 
simultaneous identifiers, does not negate the 
materiality of the tree, or its potential to be 
identified in different ways at different 
times. What the tree “is” exists apart from 
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language and it is only by labeling it so that 
we bring it into existence as that particular 
thing. Art, in this respect, is exposed as an 
affordance relative to a language and a 
culture.  
            By acknowledging art as an 
affordance as opposed to one specific idea, 
which would in turn have to have its own 
rules and properties by which to abide, we 
open the possibility for any object to possess 
the capacity for art-ness. An artist may be 
looked at as any individual who appropriates 
an object in such a manner that they expose 
its art-ness. Objects of natural creation, such 
as a tree, may be photographed in such a 
fashion that the observer is forced to engage 
with its potential for art-ness. 
 
Conclusion 
  I have defined a way in which art 
may be considered a property as opposed to 
a concept in itself. Defining art as its own 
concept is incredibly problematic, such that 
objects get omitted, contested and dismissed 
as art based on their adherence, or lack 
thereof, to a certain set of characteristics and 
principles. By advocating that art is instead, 
a property, an affordance, of any object, the 
expression of “art-ness” is allowed to 
become noticeable in any object that is 
observed. An affordance is revealed in the 
course of action, and for “art-ness” to be 
exposed, a certain communicative process 
must occur between the observer and the 
object observed, whereby the object is 
considered in a reflexive thought process. If 
we accept this definition, it is obvious how 
and why some objects may be considered 
“art” and others not, on both individual and 
communal bases. Art is not a subjective 
opinion; it is a subject of discovery based on 
individual thought. An experience with an 
object exposes a property but it does not 
create it. Although it seems a less tangible 
property, art is nevertheless an affordance, 
for we may at any time see it expressed in 
any object.  
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